In 1976, the Basic Agreement introduced free agency to Major League Baseball; previously, the reserve clause gave a team indefinite monopsonistic rights to a player's services.
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Section I: Introduction
According to James Quirk and Rodney Fort, "Sports leagues are in the business of selling competition on the playing field." It is, therefore, not surprising that competitive balance is important in keeping fan interest. But, as Andrew Zimbalist notes, "There has always been some degree of competitive imbalance in baseball… Viewed as a business, baseball or any other sport would rather have teams from bigger cities win more frequently than teams from smaller cities."
In 1970, Curt Flood sued Major League Baseball (MLB) to become a free agent. 2 Owners supporting the reserve clause, a system that allowed teams to retain a player's rights indefinitely, argued that free agency would lead to league domination by teams with the largest markets, destroying competitive balance.
The owners' argument is directly contradicted by the economic theory proposed by Ronald Coase, which asserts that in the absence of transaction costs and other economic distortions, the bargaining process will produce the same outcome regardless of how property rights are originally allocated.
3 Under the Coasian argument, a player would end up on the team where his marginal revenue product is greatest regardless of the bargaining system -free agency or the reserve clause. 4 The only theoretical difference between free agency and the reserve clause system would be that under free agency players accrue a significantly greater part of their value; rents would transfer from owners to players rather than a change in player allocation.
This discrepancy between economic theory and the claims of owners has provoked my research into the effect of the 1976 Basic Agreement, which brought about free agency, on competitive balance. "The assumption that the market is free of transaction costs and other distorting factors makes the application of the Coase Theorem and the Invariance Proposition to most real world markets [such as Major League Baseball] rather precarious" (Bowen) . This paper tests the claim that free agency has had no effect on competitive balance. Section II of the paper provides an overview of the previous literature on this topic. Section III examines historical influences on competitive balance and Section IV proposes an empirical model.
Section V presents the results of the model drawing on data from 1950-2001, and Section VI offers conclusions about the subject.
Section II: Previous Research
A 1985 article by David Besanko and Daniel Simon addressed the effect of free agency on competitive balance using National League data from 1970-1983 (seven years of pre-free agency [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] and seven years of post-free agency [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] These results, however, should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that free agency improves (or has no effect on) competitive balance. Bowen's paper identifies possible causes of this trend aside from free agency: the introduction of a reverse order draft in 1965 and the compression of player talent. as a result, it is an important variable to consider when attempting to extract the change in MLB competitive balance caused by free agency.
Section IV: The Empirical Model
As with the previous research, I measure competitive balance using standard deviation of team winning percentages; this statistic is the model's dependent variable. The model also includes eight independent variables that estimate the effect of free agency and control for 1) the presence of a reverse-order amateur draft, 2) the compression of player talent, 3) short-term shocks caused by expansion and work stoppages, 4) the long-term effects associated with league expansion.
A dummy variable equal to one for years with a reverse-order amateur draft (years after 1964) controls for the influence of the draft on competitive balance. It follows that enabling teams who performed the worst in the previous year to have a higher draft choice (and thus the rights to the more desirable amateurs) would increase the competitive balance in the league.
One would expect this dummy variable to have a positive contribution to competitive balance and, therefore, a negative coefficient (lowering the standard deviation). League expansion or contraction could also produce a long-term effect on competitive balance. With fewer teams, the more a super-performance or sub-performance affects the overall standard deviation of team winning percentages. To control for the long-term effects of expansion, my model includes a count of the teams in the league.
In order to estimate the effect of free agency on competitive balance, the model includes an independent variable that counts the number of players who declared free agency in the previous year. The Coase Theorem would suggest that this variable have a coefficient of zero:
the number of players who own their playing rights should not affect competitive balance. The owners would hypothesize that an increasing number of free agents gives greater buying power to large market teams and hence more competitive imbalance (positive coefficient).
Previous literature has used a dummy variable equal to one for years where there has been a system of free agency. My own intuition is that in the early stages of free agency, the small number of players who became free agents (relative to today's standards) caused its effect to be minor (and return insignificant results). From this intuition, I, therefore, included a variable that counts the number of free agents (rather than a dummy variable) to measure free agency's effect on competitive balance.
The econometric model to be estimated is as follows:
Where:
NFRAG i = Number of players who declared free agency in year i-1.
DRAFT i = Dummy variable equal to 1 for the presence of a reverse order draft.
POPPCT i -Number of MLB roster positions / US population in year i. GAMES i -Average number of games played by a team in year i.
TEAMS i -Number of teams in MLB in year i.
The DRAFT variable controls for the reverse-order amateur draft. The POPPCT variable controls for compressing talent. EXPAN1, EXPAN2, EXPAN3 are dummy variables that control for the short-term shocks associated with league expansion. GAMES is a variable that controls for shocks to competitive balance caused by work stoppages. The TEAMS variable accounts for the long-term effects on competitive balance attributed to league expansion. By controlling for these factors, this regression model should provide a more accurate and robust estimation of the effect of free agency competitive balance; this effect is measured by the NFRAG variable. 9 The data on winning percentages and number of teams was compiled from baseball-reference.com. The data on free agents was compiled from The Sporting News. The data on US population was compiled from census.gov. The variables NFRAG, DRAFT, POPPCT, EXPAN1, and TEAMS were all significant at the 5 percent level. 10 The coefficients of these variables follow their expected direction.
Section V: Results
The estimated coefficient of the NFRAG variable was positive and highly significant (p < .01). 11 This implies that free agency does indeed have an effect on competitive balance.
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Specifically, the greater number of available free agents, the higher the standard deviation of winning percentages. The positive coefficient supports the owners' argument that free agency harms competitive balance.
The estimated coefficient of the DRAFT variable, similar to Bowen's findings, was negative and significant at the 5 percent level. These results are consistent with the intention of the draft; the coefficient indicates that the reverse-order amateur draft has had a negative effect on standard deviation and thus a positive effect on competitive balance.
The estimated coefficient of the POPPCT variable was positive and significant at the 1 percent level. As expected, the positive coefficient implies that as this statistic decreases, the league becomes more competitively balanced. This result gives strong support to Zimbalist's theory that player talent compression has brought about heightened competitive balance over time.
The The estimated coefficient of the TEAMS variable was negative and significant at the 1 percent level, mirroring Bowen's American League regression results. Logically, with more teams, the less a single team's deviation from expected performance affects the overall distribution of team winning percentages. The GAMES variable, though not significant (p=.25) also had a negative that free agency has recently contributed about .030 annually to standard deviation. Namely, free agency has recently been a very important factor, which can be attributed to a standard deviation increase of roughly 40 percent.
coefficient; this indicates the expected result -the more games played the lower the standard deviation.
The results of the regression, aside from the insignificant variables of EXPAN2 and EXPAN3, all have coefficients that are consistent with the intuition behind their inclusion.
Section VI: Conclusion and Related Issues
Previous research into the effect of free agency on competitive balance has used a dummy variable equal to 1 from 1977 onwards in econometric models of competitive balance. The result of this approach has been that most researchers have found the coefficient of this dummy variable to be insignificant; these results have suggested that the Coase Theorem, which would hold that ownership of playing rights should have no effect on competitive balance (in the absence of transaction costs and other economic distortions), applies to free agency in Major League Baseball. Bowen's study, which controls for many of the factors that may have an effect on competitive balance, dissented from the previous literature's conclusions. His model indicated that free agency has harmed competitive balance in the American League (though his regression returned insignificant results in the National League).
My intuition was that the number of free agents influences the effect of free agency. Namely, when 22 players declare free agency (as in 1977), it might not have a significant effect compared to when 136 players declare (in 2000) . From this intuition, unlike any prior regression model, I included a variable that counts free agents (rather than a dummy variable) to measure free agency's effect. The high significance of this variable suggests that free agency does have an effect on competitive balance (harmful) and that (due to transaction costs or economic distortions) the Invariance Proposition does not perfectly hold for Major League Baseball.
Competitive balance has become a great concern of Major League Baseball; no team since the 1994 strike with a payroll outside the top quarter of the league has won a World Series game.
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These regression results should give insights into the potential effectiveness of proposed 13 In 1998, the New York Yankees swept the World Series against the San Diego Padres, who were in the top half (but not the top quarter) of payrolls.
remedies. Considering the demonstrated harmful effect of free agency, a salary cap or luxury tax would restrict the ability of large market teams to dominate the free agent market signings.
Applying one of these measures would eliminate or at least lessen the effect of free agency.
After an 18-month study, " 
Extensions
This section, which provides further analysis of competitive balance issues, was developed in response to comments I have received from several reviewers of my thesis. With each extension topic, I acknowledge the reviewer(s) who suggested the topic.
1) Separate Regressions on Leagues -Fort, Grabowski
Before 1997, teams from the American League (AL) and the National League (NL) did not face each other until the World Series; for the past five years, there has been some limited interleague play. My original regression pools winning percentages from these leagues in order to gauge the overall effect of free agency on MLB. Most of the previous literature separates the leagues, in that their products were independent of each other (as they never faced off in regular season play).
When dividing the sample into leagues, the AL regression returns very similar results to the pooled sample. NFRAG, EXPAN1, DRAFT, TEAMS, and POPPCT remain significant and have logical coefficients. 17 In the NL regression, the significance and, in some cases, the sign of the coefficient changes. Importantly, the NFRAG variable is insignificant (and negative) in the NL regression; the TEAMS and POPPCT variables also are insignificant in this regression.
In Bowen's study of competitive balance and free agency, his results indicated a free agency dummy variable in two models of competitive balance that was significant in the AL but not the NL. My results mirror Bowen's regression results when dividing the sample by leagues.
2) New York Yankees Effect -Grabowski, Johnson
One possibility for the discrepancy between the effect of NFRAG on the AL and NL would be a consistently unusually performing team. In the AL, the New York Yankees tend to have one of the highest payrolls and have the best overall winning performance over the duration of the sample. If the Yankees' winning percentages are removed from the sample, the average AL standard deviation drops significantly, -.00266 (t=-3.15).
In the AL regression without the Yankees winning percentages, the effect of NFRAG is not significant (t=1.23). This change would indicate that the Yankees' performances have contributed to the observed positive effect of NFRAG on standard deviation, and it would imply that the Yankees have benefited (in terms of winning) from more free agents being available.
The New York Yankees also may be responsible for the apparent significance of the DRAFT variable. At just about the same time as the draft was instituted, CBS bought the Yankees and, according to Bruce Johnson, "turned them from a dynasty to an also-ran almost 
4) log NFRAG -Grabowski, Tower
There has been an increasing number of free agents since 1977. There was an average of 27 free agents per year during the late 1970's compared to 122 annually during the 1990's.
The players who declared free agency during the 1970's were generally of higher caliber than the average player (of the 122) who declared free agency in the 1990's. Given that higher caliber players have a greater effect on winning, this might suggest that a linear model for NFRAG would not be appropriate. To adjust for the lower quality of the average free agent (as NFRAG increases), I ran a regression using the log of NFRAG.
Contrary to the intuition that higher caliber players as free agents would have a greater impact (because their play has a greater impact on winning percentages), the regression using the log of NFRAG returned an insignificant ( My regression model counted the number of free agents, but it did not assess the overall quality of the free agent pool from year to year. 18 Though the log of NFRAG model may not have been as appropriate as the linear model, total quality of the free agents most likely has an effect on competitive balance. I leave analysis of this topic for future investigation.
5) Dummy Variable -Zimbalist
My original regression measures free agency's effect on competitive balance by multiplying the regression coefficient by the number of free agents in a given season. That would imply that free agency's effect on competitive balance changes each year depending on the number of free agents. In order to estimate a constant, general effect of free agency, previous researchers have used a dummy variable. Using a free agency dummy in my pooled sample to gauge the effect of free agency returns positive (free agency causes a decline in competitive balance) but insignificant results. 18 The quality of the free agent pool could be measured by salaries or previous years' statistics.
I do not feel that an unweighted dummy is an appropriate measure because the number of free agents "grows [during the] 1980s as the free market mechanism was honed through collective bargaining" (Fort) . The intuition behind this paper is that as more players declared free agency, "a loosening of restrictions on player mobility," the greater its effect. I ran a supplemental regression using a weighted variable equal to 0 for NFRAG ≤ 3, 1 for 3<NFRAG ≤ 50, 2 for 50<NFRAG ≤ 100, and 3 for NFRAG>100; the regression returned a positive and significant coefficient for this variable.
6) POPPCT -Johnson, Meier
To The greatest contributor to this non-American presence in MLB would be Latin players.
Adjusting for Latin players, I reran the regression with a new measure of talent compression. I multiplied the POPPCT variable by the fraction of non-Latin players to get AMPOPPCT. 19 Running the regression with this variable in place of POPPCT increases the significance of NFRAG, and it also increases the significance of the talent compression control.
7) Strike and Games -Fort, Grabowski, Johnson
Given equal levels of true competitive balance, shorter seasons should have the greatest standard deviation (and thus would be represented with a higher level of competitive imbalance). Applying the same logic, we would expect that the 154-game seasons (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) in my sample) would have greater standard deviations of winning percentages than a year with 162 games (for an equal "true" level of competitive balance). To control for the number of games effect, my original regression included a GAMES variable. This variable attempted to control for the effects of shortened seasons due to labor strikes in my sample.
Running the original regression from 1962 onwards (the beginning of the 162 game season) increases the significance of the GAMES variable coefficient. I also ran a regression substituting out the GAMES variable for a strike dummy equal to 1 for years with a labor strike (1972, 1976, 1981, 1990, 1994, 1995) ; the strike dummy was positive but not significant.
These regression results follow the logic that the number of the games is inversely correlated with standard deviation.
8) Payroll -Fort, Grabowski
Free agency does not change outcomes of baseball games. It may, however, affect player distribution and team payrolls. Fan-driven changes in the value of free agents would cause changes to the coefficient of variation of payrolls. 20 It is changes to payrolls, according to
Fort, that causes the competitive balance effect observed with a growing number of free agents.
Namely, "if the value of players is growing dramatically in a few already high revenue places relative to the rest of the league, then more talent will move there and competitive balance should decline" (Fort) .
Since the introduction of free agency, there has been a general increase in the coefficient of variation for team payrolls. 21 There is also a significant, positive correlation between NFRAG and the annual coefficients of variation of payroll. Free agency (and in particular the number of free agents) likely causes changes to coefficient of variation of payrolls (in addition to merely increasing team payrolls 
